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Credit and Human Welfare: Lessons 
from Microcredit in Developing Nations 
Alan M. White* 
Abstract 
Deregulation of usury laws, in the United States and in 
developing nations, has permitted various forms of small loans to 
be made to the poor and the working class, sometimes at very high 
prices. In the case of credit, more is not always better. A human 
development approach to evaluating the welfare impacts of credit 
products for the poor asks these questions: does a credit product or 
program increase income or consumption, achieve savings through 
investment in capital goods, or smooth consumption and avert 
crises, all at a reasonable cost? Or does the credit on balance 
redistribute income away from the poor, without adequate 
offsetting benefits, or produce overindebtedness and declining 
borrower living standards? 
The model of successful small-loan programs that may 
enhance the welfare of the poor is the work of the Grameen Bank 
in Bangladesh. Grameen Bank’s microlending, savings, and 
insurance programs seem to have been effective in improving the 
lives of some Grameen borrowers. On the other hand, the 
experiences of South Africa and Bolivia with rapid expansion of 
microcredit were more problematic, resulting in crises of 
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overindebtedness and, in the case of Bolivia, a social revolt by 
borrowers. Even after the crisis in Bolivia, however, some 
microlenders and their borrowers fared better. The experiences in 
these different contexts, as well as the United States’ experience 
with payday lending, offer important insights into the benefits 
and risks of different credit products and programs for the poor. 
These insights can inform the next generation of consumer credit 
regulation, which should promote responsible lending based on 
full credit reporting, insurance, workouts to protect against and 
mitigate defaults, continual repayment of principal, 
differentiation based on credit use, and simple and transparent 
pricing. 
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I. Introduction 
How do we know when access to credit improves or harms 
consumer welfare? Can legal rules improve the aggregate welfare 
effects of small loans? The poor need credit and have always 
borrowed. At the same time, credit, especially in the form of small 
loans and credit cards, has led to national crises for developing 
countries and increased poverty and exclusion for overindebted 
individuals in developed nations. Lending to the poor has always 
posed a moral dilemma.1 Legal rules, particularly usury and 
bankruptcy laws, have struggled to find a balance between 
preventing exploitation while permitting and encouraging 
responsible credit access. Despite decades, even centuries, of legal 
experimentation, the story of credit for the poor remains a tale of 
feast or famine—overindebtedness and exploitation coexist with 
vast unmet needs for credit.2 While bankruptcy and debt-relief 
systems play a role in mediating this duality of credit and debt,3 
regulators struggle with how to and even whether to regulate 
credit markets ex ante, to encourage the benefits the unregulated 
market fails to achieve, and to mitigate the harms the 
unregulated market causes. In the United States, the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau has been tasked with 
rationalizing our system of credit regulation, relying on research 
and cost-benefit analysis.4  
                                                                                                     
 1. See Exodus 22:25 (“If you lend money to any of my people with you who 
is poor, you shall not be to him as a creditor and you shall not exact interest 
from him.”); QHURAN, Al-Baqarah 2:275–80 (condemning to hell those who 
engage in usury against the poor).  
 2. See generally CREDIT MARKETS FOR THE POOR (Patrick Bolton & Howard 
Rosenthal eds., 2005). 
 3. See Adam Feibelman, Consumer Bankruptcy as Development Policy, 39 
SETON HALL L. REV. 63, 68 (2009) (arguing that consumer bankruptcy can work 
to promote growth and development). 
 4. See Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§ 1031–1032, 124 Stat. 1376, 2005–07 (governing 
unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices and disclosure to consumers of the costs, 
benefits, and risks associated with financial products and services); see also 
Arthur E. Wilmarth, The Dodd–Frank Act’s Expansion of State Authority to 
Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 921 (2011) 
(explaining the Director of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s powers 
to regulate disclosure of the costs, benefits, and risks of financial products and 
services). 
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Extensive empirical research literature has developed 
around the welfare impacts of microlending in the developing 
world.5 Similar literature has also emerged debating the benefits 
and harms of payday and “fringe” lending in the United States.6 
While payday lending and microenterprise credit are conceptually 
distinct, they can serve as product substitutes, and, more 
importantly, similar issues arise in attempts to weigh their costs 
and benefits. The experiences of different nations with microloans 
to the poor and the extensive research on both consumer and 
microenterprise lending can offer insights for regulators seeking 
to craft a fair and effective regulatory structure for small-loan 
credit. The welfare impacts of microlending are clearly mixed, but 
existing research offers some empirical insights about loan 
                                                                                                     
 5. See, e.g., BEATRIZ ARMENDARIZ DE AGHION & JONATHAN MORDUCH, THE 
ECONOMICS OF MICROFINANCE 199–229 (2005); Jonathan Morduch, The 
Microfinance Promise, 37 J. ECON. LITERATURE 1569 (1999); John Weiss & 
Heather Montgomery, Great Expectations: Microfinance and Poverty Reduction 
in Latin America and Asia (ADB Inst. Discussion Paper No. 15, 2004). For links 
to numerous studies, see the Microcredit Summit Campaign Commissioned 
Papers, Microcredit Summit Campaign, http://www.microcreditsummit.org 
/commissioned_papers (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington 
and Lee Law Review).  
 6. See, e.g., John P. Caskey, Payday Lending:  New Research and the Big 
Question (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 10-32, 2010), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1696019; 
Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday 
Loan Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ L. REV. 563 (2010); Lynn Drysdale & 
Kathleen E. Keest, The Two-Tiered Consumer Financial Services Marketplace: 
The Fringe Banking System and Its Challenge to Current Thinking About the 
Role of Usury Laws in Today’s Society, 51 S.C. L. REV. 589 (2000); Iain Ramsay, 
The Alternative Consumer Credit Market and Financial Sector: Regulatory 
Issues and Approaches, 35 CANADIAN BUS. L.J. 325 (2001); Michael A. Stegman 
& Robert Faris, Payday Lending: A Business Model That Encourages Chronic 
Borrowing, 17 ECON. DEV. Q. 8 (2003); Scott E. Carrell & Jonathan Zinman, In 
Harm’s Way? Payday Loan Access and Military Personnel Performance (Fed. 
Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper No. 08-18, Aug. 1, 2008), available at 
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~jzinman/Papers/PayDay_AirForce_aug08.pdf; Mark 
Flannery & Katherine Samolyk, Payday Lending: Do the Costs Justify the Price? 
(FDIC Ctr. for Fin. Res. Working Paper No. 2005–09, 2005), available at 
http://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/cfr/2005/wp2005/CFRWP_2005-09_Flannery_ 
Samolyk.pdf; Leslie Parrish & Uriah King, Ctr. for Responsible Lending, Phantom 
Demand: Short-Term Due Date Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, 
Accounting for 76% of Total Volume (July 9, 2009), http://www.responsible 
lending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-demand-short-term-due-date-
generates-need-for-repeat-payday-loans-accounting-for-76-of-total-volume.html 
(last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
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characteristics that are more or less likely to result in net 
borrower benefits.  
In the United States, the Community Reinvestment Act,7 and 
the community economic development movement more broadly,8 
promote lending to low-income individuals and in low-income 
communities as a positive, and even essential, tool for improving 
the welfare of the poor. On the other hand, consumer and civil 
rights advocates decry the debt treadmill created by payday 
lenders9 who make small loans to low- and moderate-income 
borrowers and predatory mortgage lending that strips wealth 
from low-income and minority families.10 Congress and the states 
have also passed laws restricting high-cost mortgage and 
consumer loan pricing and terms because of the perceived 
harmful effects on consumer welfare.11 
                                                                                                     
 7. 12 U.S.C. § 2901 (2006); see also Richard D. Marsico, Enforcing the 
Community Reinvestment Act: An Advocate’s Guide to Making the CRA Work for 
Communities, 27 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 129, 129 (July 2001) (providing a 
guide to community investment advocates for using the Consumer 
Reinvestment Act to increase lending in their neighborhoods). 
 8. See JULIA ANN PARZEN & MICHAEL HALL KIESCHNICK, CREDIT WHERE IT’S 
DUE: DEVELOPMENT BANKING FOR COMMUNITIES 10–27 (1992) (explaining the 
importance of access to credit to community economic development); Susan R. 
Jones, Current Issues in the Changing Roles and Practices of Community 
Economic Development Lawyers, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 437, 468 (noting that 
changes in the community economic development field have expanded the role of 
public interest lawyers, increasing the need for advanced legal services). 
 9. Parrish & King, supra note 6, at 2 (noting that a majority of payday 
borrowers must take out a new loan soon after repaying the prior loan because 
the repayment left them insufficient funds); Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at 
19 (noting the “explosive growth of payday lending as a source of short-term 
consumer credit in low- and moderate-income (LMI) communities”). 
 10. See DANIEL IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, 
DEREGULATION AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 133–54 
(2009) (discussing the costs of high-risk lending to low-income borrowers); 
Debbie Gruenstein Bocian et al., Center for Responsible Lending, Foreclosures 
by Race and Ethnicity: The Demographics of a Crisis (2010), available at 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/research-analysis/foreclosure 
s-by-race-and-ethnicity.pdf (arguing that the public sector’s failure with respect 
to the 2008 subprime mortgage collapse “was its inability or unwillingness to 
adequately address predatory lending practices, not in its support of lending to 
historically underserved communities”). 
 11. See, e.g., Homeownership Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA), 15 
U.S.C.A. § 1639 (2010) (setting federal standards for mortgages, including 
disclosure requirements and limitations on, for example, balloon payments, 
negative amortization, and the extension of credit without regard to the 
consumer’s ability to pay); North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, N.C. GEN. 
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Very small loans, or microcredit, and the experience of 
developing nations in promoting and then regulating microcredit, 
offer important lessons in the ways credit can either alleviate or 
exacerbate poverty. In the developing world, microcredit has been 
hailed as a key tool for alleviating poverty, and the microcredit 
industry has grown dramatically in the past twenty years. The 
successes and failures of widely varying models and legal regimes 
for microcredit and microfinance can inform credit regulation and 
oversight in both developed and developing nations. In Part II of 
this Article, I consider the utilitarian and equity concerns that 
should motivate credit policy, using a human development 
framework. A defensible theory of welfare economics is an 
essential foundation for any coherent utilitarian evaluation of 
credit laws. In Parts III and IV, I review the recent microcredit 
experiences of Bangladesh, South Africa, and Bolivia and the 
evidence of effects on borrower welfare. In Part V, I survey the 
debate in the United States concerning regulation of payday 
loans and the incoherent legal response to dealing with payday 
lending to date. Finally, I propose some principles for future 
credit regulation and areas for further research, drawing on the 
theoretical framework of human development welfare economics 
and the empirical lessons learned from the United States’ and 
developing nations’ experiences with small loans to the poor and 
working class. 
II. The Welfare Economics of Small-Loan Credit 
Much of the disagreement between researchers who conclude 
that microcredit and payday lending is either beneficial or 
harmful is a result of asking different questions. Advocates of 
regulation tend to focus on spiraling debt, the costs of debt 
default, and high interest and fees (compared to other types of 
loans), treating these as welfare harms, and they also cite more 
                                                                                                     
STAT. 24-1.1E (2011) (placing restrictions and limitations on high-cost home 
loans); see also LEAH A. PLUNKETT ET AL., NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., SMALL 
DOLLAR LOAN PRODUCTS SCORECARD—UPDATED (2010), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/elements/www.consumerfed.org/file/Updated_Score
card.pdf (surveying state laws restricting payday loans and similar products and 
documenting and scoring each state’s actions concerning small loan products); 
infra text accompanying notes 151–78. 
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direct welfare losses, such as psychological harm and social 
exclusion resulting from excessive debt.12 Advocates of the free 
market, on the other hand, measure access to credit as an end in 
itself, and they invoke substitution effects, i.e., the argument that 
restricting one form of credit will merely drive borrowers to other, 
less beneficial forms.13 These regulation opponents often assume 
that reduced credit access reduces welfare, although in some 
cases they attempt to measure welfare losses directly, such as 
unemployment or subjective assessment of financial well-being.14 
A comprehensive approach to credit regulation requires a 
comprehensive and sound theory of welfare maximization, or at 
least of net welfare improvement, and therefore a careful account 
of all the categories of welfare benefits and harms that credit and 
debt produce. 
A. The Inadequacy of Revealed Preferences 
By conventional measures, microcredit in the developing 
world has been a tremendous success.15 By the end of 2009, 
microlenders reported having reached 190 million individuals, 
68% of whom were among the poorest (the $1 per day World Bank 
                                                                                                     
 12. See Martin, supra note 6, at 570–78 (concentrating primarily on payday 
lending’s high interest rates, high fees, and the so-called “debt trap,” the 
situation that arises when a borrower must take out repeated loans because the 
repayment of prior loans leaves them with inadequate funds); Parrish & King, 
supra note 6, at 4 (finding that the “debt trap” causes borrowers, over the entire 
industry, to pay $3.5 billion annually in extra fees); Stegman & Farris, supra 
note 6, at 8–9 (noting that payday lenders “charge fees that, although moderate 
in absolute terms, translate into extremely high and profitable compound 
interest rates” and that “the incidence of repeat borrowing at additional fees by 
individual borrowers has grown to epidemic proportions”). 
 13. Jonathan Zinman, Restricting Consumer Credit Access: Household 
Survey Evidence on Effects Around the Oregon Rate Cap 3 (Federal Reserve 
Bank of Phila. Working Paper No. 08-32, 2008), available at http://www. 
philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-papers/2008/wp08-
32.pdf (finding that a significant reduction in the availability of payday loans in 
Oregon resulted in former borrowers shifting to inferior substitutes). 
 14. See id. (stating that “employment status is a useful proxy for (financial) 
well-being here because unemployment is likely to be involuntary” and noting 
that “subjective assessments help address the issue that financial condition may 
be difficult to infer from objective choices and outcomes”). 
 15. For a review of the literature on microcredit, see DE AGHION & 
MORDUCH, supra note 5, at 12–17. 
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extreme poverty threshold) and 82% of whom were women.16 
Viewed in terms of “efficiency,” i.e., the number and volume of 
voluntary transactions, it seems that microcredit has been a boon 
to the welfare of lenders and borrowers in poor countries. This 
has been the case not only in Bangladesh, where the Grameen 
Bank pioneered microcredit as we know it, but all over south 
Asia, Latin America, and even Africa.17 Similarly, in the United 
States, the growth of payday lending and related categories of 
small loans to lower-income workers has been called “explosive.”18 
While microlending, narrowly defined, is a product separate and 
distinct from payday lending, i.e., small, short-term consumer 
loans to wage earners, in deregulated environments the two 
products can easily become substitutes, and they exhibit 
numerous similarities in their observed welfare harms and 
benefits.19 
If we rely on the revealed preference measure of consumer 
welfare, then any credit expansion by definition improves 
consumer welfare.20 Revealed preference theory posits that 
consumers express preferences through market purchases, 
including the purchase of a loan.21 If borrowing is a transaction 
that reveals the borrower’s preferences, then any voluntary loan 
or credit transaction could be thought to enhance welfare, if 
welfare is utility and utility consists of revealed preferences.22 
                                                                                                     
 16. SAM DALEY-HARRIS, MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN,  STATE OF THE 
MICROCREDIT SUMMIT CAMPAIGN REPORT 2011 3, available at http://www.micro 
creditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/2011/SOCR_2011_EN_web.pdf. 
 17. Id. at 59–68 (listing all verified microfinance institutions by region and 
providing data on number of clients, percentage of clients among the world’s 
poorest, and percentage of female clients). 
 18. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at 8. 
 19. See Muhammad Sayeedul Haque & Masahiro Yamao, Can Microcredit 
Alleviate Rural Poverty? A Case Study of Bangladesh, 36 WORLD ACAD. SCI. ENG. 
& TECH. 648, 655 (2009). 
 20. See e.g., Marc Anthony Fusaro & Richard E. Ericson, The Welfare 
Economics of “Bounce Protection” Programs, 33 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 55, 55 (2010) 
(arguing that bounce protection fees at an effective 1,900% interest rate enhance 
consumer welfare based on revealed preference analysis).  
 21. Paul Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumers’ Behaviour, 5 
ECONOMICA 61, 61 (1938) (describing revealed preference theory of utility 
measurement in the seminal article on the subject). 
 22. See Amartya K. Sen, Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral 
Foundations of Economic Theory, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 317, 322 (1977) (showing 
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Thus, any regulation that constrains voluntary credit 
transactions would reduce consumer welfare. On the other hand, 
a more robust approach to welfare economics recognizes that 
borrowers can suffer net harm from voluntary transactions, as 
when borrowers’ income, consumption, and other measures of 
well-being decline as a result of getting a loan. Moreover, from a 
macroeconomic point of view, aggregate increases in consumer 
borrowing, and corresponding declines in savings, jeopardize 
future output growth and, hence, aggregate welfare.23 
The notion that if you buy something, it must make you 
better off, has obvious limitations as a utilitarian norm for 
evaluating credit for the poor.24 Among the many flaws with 
revealed preference theory, several undermine its usefulness 
when considering credit regulation. 
The first flaw is the problem of income distribution. 
Preferences are revealed through purchasing, and income and 
assets limit purchasing. Income is limited in any economy with 
involuntary unemployment and underemployment. For 
consumption goods, this means a market allocation through 
revealed preferences will favor luxury goods, and a social welfare 
function based on revealed preferences will inadequately supply 
basic needs to the poor.  
Credit is a peculiar type of market good, and because of its 
peculiarity, the poor will tend to purchase it in excess. Credit is 
not a consumption good; it is a device to trade present 
consumption for future consumption. The welfare gain of 
borrowing must be distinguished from welfare gains from 
consumption that borrowing makes possible. The purchase made 
with a loan will soon be offset by the later forgone purchases 
prevented when the loan must be repaid.  
                                                                                                     
that, in a simplified model, engaging in an action provides a revealed 
preference, which must be chosen because it provides greater utility). 
 23. See Aldo Barba & Massimo Pivetti, Rising Household Debt: Its Causes 
and Macroeconomic Implications—A Long-Period Analysis, 33 CAMBRIDGE J. 
ECON. 113, 118 (2009) (noting that “a characteristic feature of the long-run 
analysis of household debt is that, being output as potential, consumer credit 
impinges on production as it affects the amount of saving channelled into 
investment”). 
 24. See AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 76–81 (1999). 
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Consider the borrower with a $1,000 monthly income who 
borrows $200 with a promise to repay $280 a month later. The 
borrower’s consumption over two months will be $1,200 in month 
one, but only $720 in month two, or $1,920. Without the loan the 
borrower would have consumed $2,000 of goods and services. Is 
the income-constrained borrower really expressing a preference 
for that reduced consumption over two months, or is she simply 
responding in the present to immediate needs? The question is 
not whether the $200 expended produced a welfare gain in the 
short run; it is whether advancing the use of the $200 by thirty 
days produced a large enough benefit to offset the $80 cost in the 
long run.  
The “preference” of the poor for borrowing is driven by 
chronic income shortfalls, a preference they would not reveal if 
they had adequate income-earning opportunities.25 Thus the poor 
can use credit in welfare-enhancing ways but also out of 
desperate and immediate need for money with which to reveal 
their basic preference to eat. This is particularly true when the 
borrower considers the possibility of not repaying, and the 
consequences of not repaying the borrowed money in the later 
time period are uncertain (or irrationally discounted by the 
borrower). In other words, the borrower may have incorrect 
information or beliefs about the need to curtail future 
consumption as the trade-off for current consumption that 
borrowing makes possible.  
The second flaw with revealed preference as a proxy for 
welfare is that preferences are unstable and inconsistent. 
Revealed preference theory assumes fixed and stable preferences, 
which real people, rich and poor alike, do not exhibit.26 A 
theoretical rational consumer will trade off future consumption 
for present consumption (i.e., borrow) only based on a careful 
calculation discounting future consumption at some reasonable 
                                                                                                     
 25. See Lois Lupica, The Consumer Debt Crisis and the Reinforcement of 
Class Position, 40 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 593–94 (2009) (noting that “borrowers 
who are driven by need, however, know that payday lenders are exploiting 
them, that credit cards are a trap, and that rent-to-own stores are a rip-off, but 
in the face of such dire need, the price of credit and the effects of indebtedness 
become irrelevant”). 
 26. See Ramsay, supra note 6, at 371 (showing that individuals tend to 
have time-inconsistent preferences and poorly calculate the probabilities of 
uncertain future events). 
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discount rate. A human being will discount the future to 
something close to zero, especially when hungry children are in 
the house. The same borrower will experience severe distress 
when the consequences of the borrowing decision are met and 
there is no money for food after the loan comes due.27 To say that 
such a borrower has revealed her preferences over both time 
periods is a shallow measure of utility indeed. It is only because 
the consumer in the present has the decision power that she 
usurps the preferences of herself as consumer in the future. In 
fact, if asked, the consumer might express a preference for self-
restraint devices (like low credit-card limits) because she is aware 
of time-inconsistent preferences and self-control problems.28 
Moreover, the overconfidence bias leads borrowers to assume a 
much greater disposable income to repay loans in the future than 
is likely to be available.29 This overconfidence combines with the 
rationalizing function, by which the borrower mitigates the 
mental stress of knowing she is borrowing money she cannot 
repay, to justify borrowing decisions that do not maximize 
welfare in the long term.30 Amartya Sen and Jon Elster have also 
pointed out that preferences adapt to the circumstances of the 
                                                                                                     
 27. See Brian Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the 
Payday Lending Market, 126 Q.J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011) (finding that increased 
access to payday borrowing leads to difficulties in paying for essential goods and 
services including rent, utilities, and medical care). 
 28. See Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying for Help: How Self-
Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 693, 736 (2003) (arguing that a rational individual may place self-
imposed limitations on their available choices to prevent the temptation to 
select an option that would be harmful in the long term); Angela Littwin, 
Beyond Usury: A Study of Credit Card Use and Preference Among Low-Income 
Consumers, 86 TEX. L. REV. 451, 479–88 (2008) (discussing several policy 
measures that would increase consumers’ ability to impose limits on their 
temptation to abuse credit cards, including allowing consumers to opt out of 
credit card offers and granting consumers the ability to cap their credit limit). 
 29. See Lauren Willis, Against Financial Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. 
REV. 197, 235 (2008) (explaining that, due to inaccurate predictions of future 
employment and income, borrowers will often secure unaffordable loans); Cass 
Sunstein, Boundedly Rational Borrowing, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 249, 251 (2006) 
(arguing that excessively optimistic borrowers will tend to make welfare-
reducing choices because they do not sufficiently consider problems associated 
with borrowing). 
 30. See Willis, supra note 29, at 235 (noting that “consumers can avoid fear 
and anxiety when contemplating objectively unpleasant facts of life by 
perceiving personal risk overoptimistically”). 
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consumer, so that for example, poor people learn to be satisfied 
with conditions that seem objectively intolerable and leave them 
far short of truly satisfying basic human needs for shelter, 
security, health, and education.31 
A third and related flaw with revealed preferences as a tool 
to measure the welfare effects of consumer credit is that 
preferences can be manipulated. Consumer behavioral biases and 
abbreviated reasoning are well understood and exploited by 
sellers of credit.32 Lenders shape borrower preferences.33 Thus, 
consumers can be and are persuaded to enter credit transactions 
that reduce their consumption in the present and future, do not 
result in investment or other gains, and simply transfer their 
limited resources to lenders and investors.34 Preferences that 
have been manipulated and exploited by lenders cannot 
reasonably be equated with a borrower’s welfare or utility. 
Income inequality, instability and adaptability of preferences, 
and lender exploitation lead poor borrowers into crises of 
overindebtedness, or at least into chronic distress of carrying 
interest payment burdens that further diminish their already 
                                                                                                     
 31. See generally JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF 
RATIONALITY (1983); AMARTYA SEN, RESOURCES, VALUES AND DEVELOPMENT  
(1984). 
 32. See Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1, 46 (2008) (explaining that because borrowers were overly optimistic 
concerning the probability of future borrowing, they focused on the annual fee, 
which would be paid regardless of borrowing, instead of the interest rate, and, 
as a result, lenders lower the annual fee and increase the interest rate); Jason 
Kilborn, Behavioral Economics, Overindebtedness and Comparative Consumer 
Bankruptcy: Searching for Causes and Evaluating Solutions, 22 EMORY BANKR. 
DEV. J. 13, 16 (2005) (noting that, after the “liberalization” of consumer credit 
regulations in the 1980s, the resulting competition pressured lenders to market 
and structure their products to exploit their customers’ psychological biases); 
Alan M. White, Behavior and Contract, 27 LAW & INEQ. 135, 150 (2009) (finding 
that, armed with the knowledge of consumers’ biases, “marketers engage in 
various strategies to increase sales by exploiting consumer search costs, 
obfuscation, identity group marketing, focusing on salient features, identifying 
with consumers’ subjective goals, and other strategies”). 
 33. See Patricia A. McCoy, A Behavioral Analysis of Predatory Lending, 38 
AKRON L. REV. 725, 730 (2005) (arguing that lenders manipulate the borrower’s 
reference points, framing the possible outcomes, which influences the borrower’s 
choices). 
 34. See Lauren Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The 
Problem of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 707, 785–87 (2006) 
(discussing the effects of lender framing on consumer choices). 
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inadequate purchasing power. These readily observable 
consequences raise concerns, not only about consumer welfare, 
but also about the distributional effects of credit regulation or 
nonregulation35 and the external costs of overindebtedness.36 The 
dilemma for credit regulation, therefore, is to take account of the 
fact that voluntary credit transactions can be harmful to 
borrowers and to the broader society, while still acknowledging 
the various ways in which credit and debt can enhance consumer 
welfare in both the short and long term. 
Empirical studies that attempt to measure the welfare effects 
of microcredit on the poor have reached mixed conclusions. In 
several countries, like South Africa and Bolivia, liberalized 
microlending has led to serious overindebtedness and further 
impoverished the people it was intended to help.37 Even in 
Bangladesh, the success story of Grameen Bank has been clouded 
by evidence of extremely aggressive debt collection and even 
domestic violence resulting from the lending program, and the 
ability of microloans to raise individuals from poverty on a lasting 
basis is still controversial.38 On the other hand, some studies 
have asked the right question and found that microlending has 
resulted in improvements in borrowers’ income, consumption 
stability, and other measures of well-being.39 
                                                                                                     
 35. See Edward C. Glaeser & José Scheinkman, Neither a Borrower nor a 
Lender Be: An Economic Analysis of Interest Restrictions and Usury Laws, 41 
J.L. & ECON. 1, 3 (1998) (arguing that usury laws restricting interest rates help 
redistribute income from rich to poor); Iain Ramsay, Consumer Credit Law, 
Distributive Justice and the Welfare State, 15 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUDS. 177, 178 
(1995) (arguing that “the primary questions in relation to consumer credit 
regulation are distributional, and are linked to the achievement  of values such 
as security, autonomy, and equality of access to credit markets”).  
 36. See Javier Bianchi, Credit Externalities: Macroeconomic Effects and 
Policy Implications, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 398, 398 (2010) (finding that excessive 
borrowing can substantially increase the number and severity of financial 
crises). 
 37. See infra notes 118–66 and accompanying text. 
 38. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Reflections in a Distant Mirror: Why the West 
Has Misperceived the Grameen Bank’s Vision of Microcredit, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 
217, 293–94 (2005); see also Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, at 655 (cataloging 
the failures of the microcredit institutions to adequately alleviate rural poverty). 
 39. See Richard Rosenberg, Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, Does 
Microcredit Really Help Poor People? (2010), available at 
http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.41443/fn59.pdf (finding that, while 
microcredit may not alleviate poverty, it prevents threats to the poor’s minimum 
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B. Rethinking the Consumer Welfare Benefits and Harms of 
Credit 
These observations raise an essential first question: by what 
measure (other than revealed preferences) are we to evaluate the 
benefits and harms of credit extended to the poor? Credit might 
improve consumer welfare in several ways.40 Enterprise loans 
that permit borrowers to invest in income-producing assets or 
activities and then to earn a return that exceeds the cost of the 
credit offer the easiest example.41 An important and related 
second benefit of small loans is to preserve employment. A low-
wage worker might borrow a small sum to repair a car, buy a 
uniform, or deal with a short-term emergency to preserve her 
ability to go to work.42  
When money is borrowed for consumption rather than 
entrepreneurship, permanent welfare is increased if the money is 
used to purchase a durable good, like a car or washing machine, 
that provides the consumer with a present-value savings 
compared to the alternative, such as periodic payments for mass 
transit or taxis or using a laundromat.43 A second consumer-
welfare improvement results when a loan helps the consumer 
avoid a cost, such as a penalty for failing to meet an existing 
financial obligation.44 Third, some consumer and small business 
borrowing is used simply to repay other debt that is maturing or 
bears a higher interest rate, resulting in cash-flow savings. 
Finally, a consumer might simply borrow against future income 
to smooth consumption, i.e., to provide dinner for the week before 
                                                                                                     
consumption level).  
 40. See Feibelman, supra note 3, at 75–78 (discussing a number of ways 
that consumer credit can promote growth and development). 
 41. See DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 5, at 25–26 (reporting on the 
effect of introducing microcredit into a new market). But see Haque & Yamao, 
supra note 19, at 655 (finding that loans from microfinance institutions in 
Bangladesh were largely used for purposes other than those stated, including 
buying food and paying off prior loans). 
 42. See Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, Expanding Credit Access: Using 
Randomized Supply Decisions to Estimate the Impacts, 23 REV. OF FIN. STUDS. 
433, 453 (2009). 
 43. See Edward C. Lawrence & Gregory Elliehausen, A Comparative 
Analysis of Payday Loan Customers, 26 CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 299, 302 (2008).  
 44. Id. 
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payday.45 The smoothing of consumption does not reduce poverty 
in the long run, but the other uses of credit could do so by 
increasing income or reducing expenses. Consumption smoothing 
does provide a welfare benefit, albeit more difficult to quantify 
and weigh against the interest cost.46 A simple example is the 
household that borrows to continue purchasing essential 
medicines or a healthy diet for a diabetic and thus avoids costly 
medical emergencies.47 More challenging is the tradeoff between 
simply being hungry for a few days and reducing the weekly food 
budget by the cost of loan interest.  
Whether any of these welfare improvements actually occur 
should be considered an empirically testable hypothesis, rather 
than an assumption accepted on faith. Each category of possible 
benefits could be the subject of empirical measurement for a 
particular credit product in a particular market. 
Consumer credit also causes obvious and not-so-obvious 
harms to consumers. First, of course, are the interest and fees, 
i.e., the cost of the credit itself. To be sure, the cost of credit in the 
welfare-enhancing examples discussed above may be less than 
the consumer’s welfare benefit. In other words, the idealized 
rational consumer will only borrow money at interest if the 
consumer’s benefit from the loan exceeds the interest and other 
costs. Nevertheless, any fair welfare analysis of a credit product 
must weigh the cost of credit against its benefits. The higher the 
costs, the less likely there will be a positive net benefit, an 
obvious proposition but one that underlies the intuitive rationale 
for usury ceilings. Microcredit interest rates range from 20% to 
30% per annum but can sometimes be much higher.48 Payday 
                                                                                                     
 45. See Barba & Pivetti, supra note 23, at 119; Melzer, supra note 27, at 
518. 
 46. For one attempt to model the welfare benefits of credit access to smooth 
consumption, see Kartik B. Athreya, Credit Access, Labor Supply, and 
Consumer Welfare, 94 ECON. Q. 17 (2008). 
 47. The ability to borrow in order to resolve emergencies has been 
identified by poor borrowers themselves as a key welfare benefit of credit access 
and one justifying the use of high-cost loans on a short-term basis. See Littwin, 
supra note 28 (reporting the results of in-depth interviews with low-income 
women). 
 48. Richard Rosenberg et. al., Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, The 
New Moneylenders: Are the Poor Being Exploited by High Microcredit Interest 
Rates? 5 (2009), available at http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.9534/. 
1108 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (2012) 
loan rates in the United States are typically between 200% and 
500% per annum.49  
In the real world, consumers often miscalculate, or, for 
various other reasons, borrow in a situation that does not 
increase their welfare.50 Lenders are motivated to obfuscate the 
total cost of credit through complex pricing so that borrowers 
underestimate borrowing costs.51 For the poor especially, credit 
can simply aggravate a bad cash-flow situation, adding interest 
costs to an existing monthly shortfall.52 This can result in 
consumers being worse off than had they not borrowed.  
The second major category of credit harms encompasses 
those that flow from debt distress and default. Overindebted 
consumers can be pushed into default and bankruptcy by 
repeated borrowing, even in small amounts,53 and suffer 
additional costs, such as the health effects of debt-related stress,54 
                                                                                                     
 49. Will Dobie & Paige Marta Skiba, Information Asymmetries in 
Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Two Payday Lending Firms 6 
(Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 11-05, 2011) (noting that a 
typical  two week payday loan carries a 15% to 18% finance charge). 
 50. This can be due to various behavioral factors. Consumers may suffer 
from self-control problems and “choose” short-term welfare gains even when 
they understand the long-term costs far outweigh the gains. See Susan Block-
Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: Rationality, 
Behavioralism, and the Misguided “Reform” of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 
1481, 1543–44 (2006) (stating that “the impulse for immediate gratification is 
often irresistible, notwithstanding the long-term consequences of such action”). 
Borrowers also may systematically underestimate the cost of borrowing or be 
overconfident about how rapidly they will repay. Id. at 1540–41 (noting that, 
due to overconfidence bias, “borrowers are more likely to underestimate than 
overestimate the risks associated with uncertainty”). 
 51. See Willis, supra note 34, at 727–28 (arguing that in the subprime 
mortgage market, pricing is complicated and nontransparent, creating an 
information asymmetry that lenders exploit). 
 52. See Stegman & Faris, supra note 6, at 19. 
 53. See Melzer, supra note 27 (finding that payday loan access increases 
delinquencies on other debts and postponement of health care); Paige Marta 
Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy 1 (Oct. 20, 
2010) (unpublished manuscript) (finding that access to payday loans increases 
bankruptcy rates) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 54. See Karlan & Zinman, supra note 42, at 461 (finding stress-related 
mental health effects from overindebtedness); Jeannine Aversa, AP Impact: 
Debt Hurts Your Body, Too, USA TODAY, June 9, 2008 (finding that “[w]hen 
people are dealing with mountains of debt, they’re much more likely to report 
health problems”). 
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and other social and external costs.55 Overindebtedness reduces 
welfare not only when borrowers default on their payments, but 
also when they resort to reducing consumption, selling assets, or 
borrowing repeatedly to avoid payment default.56 Debt default 
results not only in direct economic costs from impaired credit 
scores, repossession of collateral, and added collection fees, but 
also in a myriad of health impairments and other negative effects 
on the borrower’s well-being.57 
The U.S. military recently concluded that high-cost credit 
was particularly detrimental to the welfare of enlisted soldiers,58 
and one experimental study found that payday borrowing 
measurably reduced job performance among Air Force 
personnel.59 In contrast, a study done in cooperation with a South 
African microlender found positive consumer welfare effects of 
expanding access to consumer credit, even at rates in excess of 
100% annual percentage rate (APR).60 The study measured 
income, consumption, physical and mental health, and credit 
scores several months after the four-month loans were due to be 
                                                                                                     
 55. See Catarina Frade & Claudia Abreu Lopes, Overindebtedness and 
Financial Stress: A Comparative Study in Europe, in CONSUMER CREDIT, DEBT 
AND BANKRUPTCY: COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 249, 249 
(William Whitford, Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen, & Iain Ramsay eds., 2009) 
(noting that “overindebtedness . . . may potentially lead to social, financial, and 
market exclusion” and “[i]n extreme cases, divorce, mental disorders, 
homelessness or even suicide”); Therese Wilson, Responsible Lending or 
Restrictive Lending Practices? Balancing Concerns Regarding Over-Indebtedness 
with Addressing Financial Exclusion, in THE FUTURE OF CONSUMER CREDIT 
REGULATION 91, 95 (Michelle Kelly-Louw, James P. Nehf & Peter Rott eds., 
2008) (stating that “consumers who find themselves over-indebted may suffer 
stress, depression, anxiety; become violent, suicidal, or homicidal; and face 
barriers to access to further credit and barriers to work”). 
 56. Adrian González & Claudio González-Vega, Overindebtedness in the 
Bolivian Microfinance Sector, 1997–2001 (Sobreendeudamiento en Las 
Microfinanzas Bolivianas, 1997–2001) (Sept. 2003), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1413005. 
 57. See Katherine Porter, The Damage of Debt, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 981 
(2012) (cataloging a wide variety of harms caused by debt distress). 
 58. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING PRACTICES 
DIRECTED AT MEMBERS OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THEIR DEPENDENTS (2006), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/report_to_congress_final.pdf 
(describing loss of security clearances, divorces, repossessions, disciplinary 
action, and discharges resulting from overindebtedness). 
 59. See Carrell & Zinman, supra note 6, at 3. 
 60. Karlan & Zinman, supra note 42, at 461. 
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repaid and compared the outcomes with a control group who were 
denied credit but had similar credit characteristics.61 Some 
increase in stress was found among the experimental group of 
borrowers with increased credit access.62 
A defensible social welfare function for credit regulation 
needs to compare utility and disutility consequences of borrowing 
for individuals, or at least to take seriously the existence of 
positive and negative welfare effects and the fact that revealed 
preferences provide an impoverished means to measure those 
effects. 
C. The Human Development Approach to Welfare Economics 
How should the welfare impact of lending to the poor be 
evaluated, and what goals should credit regulation pursue? 
Recognizing the inadequacy of gross domestic product (GDP) as a 
measure of human welfare, the human development movement 
has proposed a more sophisticated set of measures for the 
aggregate welfare of societies. These ideas have been embodied in 
the United Nations’ annual Human Development Report and 
Human Development Index (HDI),63 as well as the work of 
Amartya Sen64 and Martha Nussbaum.65 Rather than using 
average GDP as a measure of a nation’s well-being, the HDI 
combines measures of health, education, and income, but with an 
emphasis on the income of people below the median.66 The intent 
of such welfare measures is twofold: the HDI addresses 
distribution of wealth and income, recognizing that there is a 
diminishing marginal utility to income for an individual, and 
income improvement means more to the poor than to the rich. In 
other words, for a fixed level of income and assets, aggregate 
                                                                                                     
 61. Id. at 449–55 (explaining the results of the study). 
 62. Id. at 461. 
 63. See MUHBAB AL HAQ, REFLECTIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT 46–66 
(1995). 
 64. See, e.g., SEN, supra note 24; AMARTYA SEN, CHOICE, WELFARE AND 
MEASUREMENT (1982). 
 65. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, CREATING CAPABILITIES: THE HUMAN 
DEVELOPMENT APPROACH 44 (2010). 
 66. See AL HAQ, supra note 63, at 49–50. 
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utility will be greater if the poor have a larger (or less unequal) 
share of income and assets. The HDI also, and just as 
importantly, treats income as a means to the end of enhancing 
the capabilities, choices, and opportunities open to all people, and 
not as an end in itself, by measuring outcomes like health and 
literacy.67 To improve aggregate welfare measured in this way, 
policies need to improve the health, education, and other 
capabilities of the population, as well as the incomes and 
consumption levels of the poor preferentially. In other words, 
income and GDP are not direct measures of human welfare. 
Instead, welfare can and should be measured by looking at 
consumption of basic needs (food and shelter), health, education, 
and the freedom to participate in civil society, and at the 
distribution of those benefits across society. 
Credit markets seem to be an excellent place to apply the 
human development framework. Martha Nussbaum describes 
access to credit as a “fertile capability,” using the example of an 
Indian woman who was enabled “to protect her bodily integrity 
(not returning to her abusive husband), to have employment 
options, to participate in politics, to have a sense of emotional 
well-being, to form valuable affiliations, and to enjoy enhanced 
self-respect.”68 She rightly focuses not simply on the wealth and 
consumption effects of credit, but on those monetary measures as 
means to the real ends, including the capacity of all people to live 
healthy, safe lives and to develop their intellectual, emotional, 
political, and associative capabilities.69 On the other hand, if we 
recognize that in the case of consumer credit, more is not 
necessarily better, then a legal regime for creation and 
                                                                                                     
 67. See id.; AMARTYA SEN, RATIONALITY AND FREEDOM 8 n.8 (2002) 
(distinguishing between the HDI and previous measures which did not focus on 
“human development” indicators); see also NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 59 
(noting that the HDI “heavily weight[s] items (longevity, education) not typically 
emphasized in development rankings”). See generally Kerry Rittich, The Future 
of Law and Development: Second Generation Reforms and the Incorporation of 
the Social, 26 MICH. J. INT’L L. 199 (2004) (describing the move among 
international development institutions toward human development and social 
outcome measures rather than measures of economic growth for its own sake). 
 68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 65, at 44. 
 69. Id. at 33–34 (introducing the “central capabilities” that a political order 
should secure to its citizens, including bodily health, emotional well-being, and 
free association). 
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cancellation of consumer debt need not and should not be based 
on the premise that regulation should aim to maximize the 
volume of consumer lending to the poor. Instead, a partly 
utilitarian, partly egalitarian approach to credit regulation based 
on a human development framework would seek to stimulate the 
availability of welfare-enhancing credit forms, while minimizing 
the volume of harmful and damaging forms of credit, if those 
forms can be described and distinguished. Credit improves 
welfare if the borrower’s earning capacity, housing, health, 
education, and/or consumption levels are permanently improved 
as a result of borrowing. Even the stabilizing effect of 
consumption smoothing can and should be recognized as a 
welfare benefit, but consumption smoothing is obviously more 
problematic to measure and compare to the cost of borrowing. 
The higher the interest rate prevailing, of course, the less 
likely that poor borrowers are achieving net welfare benefits, but 
this will also depend on the amount of credit, its duration, and 
the use to which it is put. To summarize, a human development 
approach to distinguishing beneficial credit from harmful credit 
requires several elements. First, we need a reasonable estimate of 
improvements in income, consumption levels, health, education, 
and other indicators of well-being made possible by borrowing; 
second, and more challenging, we need a means to quantify the 
welfare benefits of consumption smoothing over time when there 
is no permanent increase in income or other measures of welfare; 
and, third, we need a comparison of those welfare benefits to the 
interest and other costs of the loan, as well as the risk-adjusted 
harms that result from debt distress and default for those who 
cannot repay their loans. 
Studies of microlending in the developing world have in fact 
attempted to measure not only the raw volume of lending but also 
its contribution to long-term reduction of poverty (i.e., 
improvement of the assets and consumption patterns of the poor), 
and the conclusions are decidedly mixed.70 Studies of small-loan 
lending in the United States have considered welfare impacts on 
individual borrowers but not on the poor preferentially. Credit 
that improves the income of the poor or permits long-term cost 
                                                                                                     
 70. See, e.g., DE AGHION & MORDUCH, supra note 5; Rosenberg, supra note 
39. 
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savings ought to be favored, while credit that exploits self-control 
problems and does not enhance welfare but simply transfers 
income from the poor to lenders and investors ought to be 
disfavored. The results of recently expanded credit access for the 
poor in different nations around the world may be instructive in 
this endeavor. 
III. Lending to the Poor in the Developing World—The Grameen 
Bank Entrepreneurial Model 
The paradigmatic success story for microcredit as a means to 
improve the welfare of the poor has been the Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh. Muhammad Yunus, winner of the 2006 Nobel Peace 
Prize, founded Grameen Bank in 1976.71 Dr. Yunus hit on the 
idea of microloans when he and his students interviewed poor 
women in a village near his university.72 They told him that 
moneylenders lent them money at high rates, then sold them 
bamboo to make stools, and at the end of the day purchased the 
finished stools for resale, leaving the women with a tiny profit.73 
If only they had the money to buy their own bamboo each day, the 
women could make a much better living.74 Dr. Yunus was 
surprised at the miniscule amounts they were borrowing and 
repaying each day, and he decided to make them a loan from his 
own pocket.75 
Under the guidance of Dr. Yunus, the Grameen Bank 
developed a unique lending method that found innovative 
solutions for some of the information and moral hazard issues 
that previously had prevented lending to the rural poor.76 
Grameen Bank’s basic loan does not require any collateral, and 
although loans are made to groups of five borrowers (nearly all 
                                                                                                     
 71. MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICROLENDING AND THE 
BATTLE AGAINST WORLD POVERTY 45 (1999). 
 72. Id. at 47–55. 
 73. Id. at 49–50 (recounting the story of a particular interview and the 
subsequent formation of the idea of microlending). 
 74. Id. at 51. 
 75. Id. at 54. 
 76. See Joseph E. Stiglitz, Peer Monitoring and Credit Markets, 4 WORLD 
BANK ECON. REV. 351, 353 (1990) (calling the Grameen Bank “a model of 
success”). 
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women), only the individual borrower is responsible for 
repayment.77 However, if a loan is not repaid on time, no new 
loans are made to any group members.78 Because payments are 
collected in public, personal honor and humiliation play an 
important role in addition to the economic incentive of access to 
future credit.79 Repayment rates are reportedly 90%.80 
No written contracts are used, nor is the legal system used in 
any way to enforce loan repayment.81 The interest rate is 10% 
add-on, equivalent to about 20% APR.82 Although the original 
intent was to fund small enterprises, Grameen Bank loans are 
used for education, consumption, housing, and other purposes not 
related to income-generating activities.83  
For the early years of its growth, Grameen Bank relied on 
grants and below-market-rate loans to fund its expensive 
operations.84 It now claims to be funded entirely from deposits of 
its members and not to have relied on grants or outside loans 
since 1998.85 The frequent and personal contact between 
Grameen staff and its borrowers, together with the small loan 
                                                                                                     
 77. YUNUS, supra note 71, at 67. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Human Worth as Collateral, 38 RUTGERS L.J. 793, 
822 (2007).  
 80. Grameen Bank, Grameen Bank Monthly Update in US$: November, 
2011, http://www.grameen-info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& 
id=453&Itemid=527 (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and 
Lee Law Review). 
 81. Grameen Bank, Grameen Bank at a Glance, http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=26&Itemid=0 (last 
visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).  
 82. See Jonathan Morduch, The Role of Subsidies in Microfinance: Evidence 
from the Grameen Bank, 60 J. DEV. ECON. 229, 243 (1999). 
 83. See DARYL COLLINS, ET AL., PORTFOLIOS OF THE POOR: HOW THE WORLD’S 
POOR LIVE ON $2 A DAY 164 (2009) (noting that, despite Grameen Bank’s intent 
that the money be spent on “productive investment,” microloans can be 
successfully used for consumption smoothing); Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, 
at 649–50 (finding that 33% of borrowers used microloans for consumption 
purposes). 
 84. See Morduch, supra note 82, at 236. 
 85. Grameen Bank at a Glance, supra note 81. Grameen Bank audited 
financial statements are available at http://www.grameen-info.org. Grameen 
provides life insurance to its borrowers at no additional charge; it has recently 
started to earn some income from ancillary businesses, for example a cell phone 
service that employs village dwellers as “telephone ladies.” Id. 
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sizes, make reaching break-even status, while charging relatively 
low interest rates, a continuing challenge.86 
Apart from the group lending model, Grameen’s loan 
program uses a variety of other features to ensure successful 
repayment: 
• Progressive increases in loan size: initial loans are 
small, and borrowers (and fellow group members) who 
successfully repay their loans become eligible for 
larger loans.87 
• Intensive staffing: Grameen operates through a vast 
network of branches, and the loan officers in the 
branches visit their clients at least once weekly.88 
During these visits, new loans are disbursed and 
payments are collected, all in public view.89 Although 
one study found that repayment rates did not drop 
measurably when borrowers paid less frequently than 
weekly,90 it still seems intuitively clear that the 
constant staff–borrower contact is one likely factor in 
Grameen’s success. It also, however, imposes salary 
costs that limit the potential for profitability and 
growth.  
• The Sixteen Decisions: Grameen Bank requires that 
each of its borrowers memorize and recite sixteen 
behavioral commitments intended to encourage her 
personal development and progress out of poverty.91 
The Decisions (so-called because they were developed 
from a bottom-up borrower consultation process) 
include such behaviors as not having too many 
children, growing vegetables, and repairing and 
upgrading houses. Although loans are not conditioned 
                                                                                                     
 86. See Morduch, supra note 82, at 230 (explaining the difficulties in 
pursuing Grameen Bank’s mission despite high per-transaction costs). 
 87. See Grameen Bank at a Glance, supra note 81. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Erica Field & Rohini Pande, Repayment Frequency and Default in 
Microfinance, Evidence from India, 6 J. EURO. ECON. ASS’N 501, 508 (2008). 
 91. YUNUS, supra note 71, at 135–37; Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 227, 
nn.46, 47. 
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on compliance, the bank does monitor success of its 
branches in achieving these goals and thus links loan 
repayment with progress out of poverty in the minds 
of its customers.92 There is some research supporting 
the effectiveness of the Sixteen Decisions. Women who 
take Grameen microloans reduce their fertility and 
increase their participation in politics and civil 
society.93  
• Loans are always amortizing. Every weekly payment 
must cover the interest due and reduce the principal 
balance.94 This contrasts with the typical payday loan 
product in the United States, which permits 
borrowers to pay interest only without reducing their 
debt.95 
• Payment defaults are always worked out if possible. 
Loan officers who are faced with a missed payment 
immediately inquire into the circumstances and 
arrange revised payment schedules if at all possible.96 
• Groups lose access to credit when payments from any 
member are not made on time.97 
• Insurance schemes: through a combination of linked 
savings accounts, life insurance, emergency loans, and 
other tools, Grameen strives to minimize loan defaults 
                                                                                                     
 92. See DAVID BORNSTEIN, THE PRICE OF A DREAM: THE STORY OF THE 
GRAMEEN BANK 95 (2005) (describing the Sixteen Decisions as “the bank’s social 
development manifesto”); YUNUS, supra note 71, at 137, 202 (describing the 
development of the Sixteen Decisions as a way to encourage social 
improvement). 
 93. See Md. Abul Basher, Empowerment of Microcredit Participants and Its 
Spillover Effects: Evidence from the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 40 J. 
DEVELOPING AREAS 173, 173–83 (2007) [hereinafter Basher, Empowerment], 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=983363 (arguing that “the Grameen Bank 
transforms its participants from a passive recipient of credit to a well responsive 
and active agent in economic and non-economic aspects of life”). 
 94. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 44–50. 
 95. Martin, supra note 6, at 564. 
 96. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 170–73 (describing Grameen’s loan 
adjustment practices); YUNUS, supra note 71, at 68–71 (noting Grameen’s high 
repayment rates). 
 97. BORNSTEIN, supra note 92, at 20, 45. 
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caused by predictable crises in the lives of its poor 
borrowers.98 
Bangladesh experiences frequent floods and other disasters. 
As a result, Grameen borrowers have frequently lost their homes 
and their businesses and have not been able to repay their 
loans.99 Grameen responds by mobilizing additional capital and 
extending emergency loans while not canceling any of the prior 
debt.100 From these experiences Grameen has learned that 
insurance schemes are essential to protect its borrowers and their 
loans against foreseeable risks faced by the poor in a country like 
Bangladesh.101 
The Grameen program is known for its focus on women. 
Grameen Bank loans initially were made equally to men and 
women, but the bank eventually concluded that women were 
better “fighters against poverty” and more likely to use money to 
improve their family’s situation rather than for unproductive 
purposes.102 On the other hand, Aminur Rahman reports that 
women often were coerced into borrowing by husbands or male 
relatives and may have faced greater violence, or at least been 
disempowered, by becoming Grameen Bank borrowers.103 
Grameen claims that 98% of its borrowers repay their loans, 
but the real nonpayment rate is probably closer to 10% or 
higher.104 Grameen Bank’s calculation compares the loans not 
repaid after one year (recall that they are due in six months or 
less) to the volume of loans outstanding.105 The denominator in 
this fraction is not comparable to the numerator because of the 
Bank’s rapid growth in loan volume, i.e., loans made in the 
current year always exceed loans made two years earlier, 
whereas it would be more meaningful to compare loans now in 
                                                                                                     
 98. YUNUS, supra note 71, at 137–40. 
 99. Id. at 138–40. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 71–72; Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 228 n.51, 261–62. 
 103. See AMINUR RAHMAN, WOMEN AND MICROCREDIT IN RURAL BANGLADESH: 
ANTHROPOLOGICAL STUDY OF THE RHETORIC AND REALITIES OF GRAMEEN BANK 
LENDING 120–26 (1999) (analyzing rates of violence against women in 
connection with their participation as Grameen borrowers). 
 104. Morduch, supra note 82, at 231–35. 
 105. Id. 
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default to all loans originated at the same time, i.e., a year ago.106 
Moreover, the borrowers reported as repaying their loans include 
many who are late in paying but have arranged some alternative 
schedule or emergency loan with Grameen to prevent complete 
default.107 Nevertheless, the percentage of borrowers who repay 
loans without difficulty is in the vicinity of 90%.108 On the other 
hand, one survey of Bangladeshi microfinance borrowers from 
multiple lenders, including Grameen Bank, found that only 51% 
of poor borrowers made weekly payments on time and found 
significant incidence of borrowers selling property or going to 
moneylenders to make microfinance payments.109 
There is considerable controversy about the effectiveness of 
Grameen Bank, both on its own terms and in comparison to other 
antipoverty strategies,110 and it is not my purpose to engage that 
debate. Several studies have shown that Grameen borrowers do 
succeed in developing microenterprises, raising their families’ 
incomes out of extreme poverty and becoming empowered in 
numerous other ways.111 These studies, as well as their critics, 
                                                                                                     
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Haque & Yamao, supra note 19, at 12–13, 16. 
 110. See id. at 17–18 (indicating that the majority of surveyed members of 
microfinance institutions felt that their involvement had not had a positive 
impact on their lives); Basher, Empowerment, supra note 93, at 180–82 
(concluding that participation empowers members to take a more active role in 
society and results in positive societal changes); Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 
221 (arguing that the “key features of the [Grameen Bank] model fail to 
eliminate the informational and other problems that contribute to market 
failure in poor communities, arguably leaving the poor with even fewer 
resources to sell their products or services”); M. Kabir Hassan, The Microfinance 
Revolution and the Grameen Bank Experience in Bangladesh, 11 FIN. MARKETS, 
INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS 205, 258 (2002) (noting that “[t]he jury is still out 
regarding the overall viability of microfinance organizations”); Rafiqul Bhuyan 
Rafiq, Shahnaz Abdullah & Hamid Ahmadi, Women Empowerment and Credit 
Control: An Empirical Analysis on Credit Recipients of Grameen Bank in 
Bangladesh, 5 ICFAI J. FIN. ECON. 21 (2007); Mark Schreiner, A Cost-
Effectiveness Analysis of the Grameen Bank of Bangladesh, 21 DEV. POL’Y REV. 
357, 369–73 (2003) (finding that the Grameen Bank was cost-effective and that 
it had positive impacts on various aspects of its members’ lives). 
 111. See SHAHIDUR R. KHANDKER, FIGHTING POVERTY WITH MICROCREDIT: 
EXPERIENCE IN BANGLADESH 51–54 (1998) (finding increases in income, 
household production, and employment associated with involvement with 
Grameen); Basher, Empowerment, supra note 93, at 173–75, 180–82 (“Grameen 
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are asking the right questions: what is the effect of loans on the 
borrowers’ consumption, health, and other indicators of well-
being?  
Critics of the microcredit movement, such as Thomas 
Dichter, dispute the welfare improvement claims made for 
Grameen Bank.112 They argue that microcredit does little but 
replace existing informal credit arrangements to fund subsistence 
activity, activity with little or no prospect of growth. The overall 
impact of Grameen on the poverty rate in Bangladesh remains 
disappointingly marginal.113 Entrepreneurs face inherent limits 
in markets and in the capacity of their country to create growth. 
Microloans mostly just smooth consumption and may have a 
limited role in unleashing productive capacity.114 Dichter also 
argues that, as more microcredit lenders have entered the field, 
the quality of the lending has deteriorated, a phenomenon he 
calls self-pollution.115 The cases of Bolivia and South Africa, 
discussed below, certainly support this view. 
Professor Rashmi Dyal-Chand has argued that Grameen 
Bank’s microlending model imposes Western and male-oriented 
values on Third World women and imposes a one-size-fits-all 
                                                                                                     
Bank also helps its participants to graduate from a passive recipient of credit to 
an active agent of economic and social process.”). 
 112. See Thomas Dichter, Hype and Hope: The Worrisome State of the 
Microcredit Movement, CGAP Microfinance Gateway (Mar. 24, 2006), 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/p/site/m/template.rc/1.26.9051/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2012) (“[T]he hoped for poverty reduction impact of microcredit remains 
elusive.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). 
 113. See Md. Abul Basher, Towards Understanding the Mismatch Between 
Micro and Macro Level Effects of Microcredit: Causes and Imperatives, 27  
BANGL. DEV. STUD. 137, 144 (2001) (finding a “very meager rate of annual 
poverty reduction”); Sarah Gibb, Microfinance’s Impact on Education, Poverty, 
and Empowerment: A Case Study from the Bolivian Altiplano 20–23 (Institute 
for Advanced Development Studies, Working Paper No. 04/2008), available at 
http://www.inesad.edu.bo/pdf/wp04_2008.pdf (finding that microloans mostly 
supported marginal informal economy activity and did little to improve 
education or women’s empowerment). 
 114. See Dichter, supra note 112 (noting that while microcredit often helps 
the poor “smooth consumption over periods of cyclical or unexpected 
crises . . . this is not what the majority of microcredit enthusiasts claim it can 
do—function as capital aimed at increasing the returns to a business activity”). 
 115. See id. (“As more and more operators have got involved, the quality of 
microcredit operations has deteriorated just as the serious veteran players have 
reached the point of perfecting their lending techniques. Microcredit is on the 
verge of becoming a self-polluting industry.”). 
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development model on widely varying cultural groups.116 The 
overreliance on the idea of universal values embedded in 
microlending, she argues, will lead to repeated failures when 
microcredit is used as a development strategy in different 
contexts, including the United States and the developed 
countries.117 While Professor Dyal-Chand is quite right to caution 
us about making cross-cultural generalizations regarding 
microcredit, certain features of successful and unsuccessful 
microlending programs can be readily identified and compared 
and can be instructive in thinking about credit regulation 
generally.  
Scholars on both sides of the debate would probably concede 
that some forms of microlending do improve the welfare of 
borrowers but that empirical study is critical to evaluating the 
real welfare costs and benefits of any microlending program. At 
this point, the evidence of net welfare improvements is mixed at 
best. Some advocates of microcredit have conceded that it does 
not consistently produce permanent income improvements and 
poverty reduction and have asserted instead the more 
problematic consumption-smoothing benefits.118 
Clearly, the loan product offered by Grameen Bank differs in 
almost every respect from the payday loan product offered in the 
United States. In fact, their only common feature is that the 
loans are small. Before considering how legal regimes might 
incorporate the lessons of microlending by Grameen Bank, it is 
instructive to consider the failures of microcredit in other 
developing nations. 
                                                                                                     
 116. See Dyal-Chand, supra note 38, at 289–94 (“The Bank does not simply 
adopt the Bangladeshi male perspective. It compounds the problem by 
superimposing on and through the model a more Western perspective about 
women’s rights, needs, and liberation.”).  
 117. Id. at 303–06. 
 118. See Rosenberg, supra note 39, at 2–6 (“Whether or not financial 
services lift people out of poverty, they are vital tools in helping them to cope 
with poverty.”). 
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IV. Failures of Microcredit: The Bolivian and South African 
Experiences 
A. Bolivia 
Bolivia is a relatively poor country, particularly compared to 
its South American neighbors.119 After an economic crisis in the 
early 1980s featuring 24,000% inflation,120 a new government 
turned to market liberalization and microcredit as a strategy for 
both poverty alleviation and economic growth.121 The microcredit 
boom in Bolivia eventually fell victim to its own success. Between 
1998 and 2004 Bolivia was plunged into another serious economic 
and political crisis, exacerbated by widespread distress and 
default brought on by its consumer lending sector.122 National 
associations of debtors were formed, holding demonstrations and 
demanding that the government intervene and cancel small-loan 
debts.123 The Bolivian experience offers an instructive 
counterpoint to the successes of microcredit in Bangladesh and 
elsewhere.  
Bolivia had suffered a serious crisis of hyperinflation in 1985, 
leading to a complete loss of confidence in the traditional banking 
sector.124 At the same time, thousands of workers lost jobs in 
mining and in government service as a result of restructuring 
promoted by the International Monetary Fund.125 The center-
right government promoted microcredit, and it expanded 
rapidly.126 Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) like Prodem 
                                                                                                     
 119. See UNITED NATIONS DEV. PROGRAMME, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT 
2007/2008, at 231 tbl.1 (ranking Bolivia 117th in the world on the 2005 U.N. 
Human Development Index). In 2005, Bolivia had a per capita GDP of $2,819. 
Id. 
 120. ELISABETH RHYNE, MAINSTREAMING MICROFINANCE: HOW LENDING TO 
THE POOR BEGAN, GREW, AND CAME OF AGE IN BOLIVIA 36–37 (2001); Jason 
Mitchell, Bolivia—Shaken But Still Standing, FIN. TIMES, July 1, 2004. 
 121. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 38–42. 
 122. Id. at 144–51; Reynaldo Marconi & Paul Mosley, Bolivia During the 
Global Crisis 1998–2004: Towards a ‘Macroeconomics of Microfinance,’ 18 J. 
INT’L DEV. 237, 238–39 (2006). 
 123. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 144–47; Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, 
at 246 n.12. 
 124. RHYNE, supra note 120, at 36. 
 125. Id. at 42. 
 126. Id. at 38–42. 
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(the precursor to BancoSol) and ProMujer followed a microcredit 
model not unlike that of Grameen Bank, including outreach to 
the rural poor and lending to groups.127 However, with much of 
Bolivia’s poor concentrated in urban centers, the first microcredit 
lenders grew more rapidly in the cities and quickly became 
profitable. The initial rapid growth of microlending in Bolivia 
contributed to a measurable reduction in poverty.128 
The government relaxed its banking regulations, allowing 
nonbank finance companies to begin accepting deposits and 
making small loans. The amounts of “small” loans rapidly 
escalated; consumer lending for durables, such as washing 
machines, began to be emphasized over microenterprise lending; 
and new competitors took progressively less care to evaluate 
borrowers’ repayment ability.129 Profit-oriented consumer loan 
companies from other Latin American countries entered the 
Bolivian market and began competing with more socially oriented 
NGO microlenders.130 From the borrowers’ perspective, the 
products of the two sectors were interchangeable, and many 
borrowers fell into a debt trap, “bicycling” their loans by 
borrowing from one lender to pay another.131 One study found 
that payment defaults were highest for Bolivian borrowers who 
went to both microfinance lenders and consumer lenders (39%), 
compared with those borrowing solely from consumer lenders 
(19%), and were lowest for microfinance lenders (11%) and NGO 
lenders (6%).132 
After the 1998 onset of the crisis, Bolivia’s GDP growth fell 
from 5% to 1%, and the bottom fell out of the retail and service 
sectors on which many microloan borrowers depended for their 
                                                                                                     
 127. Id. at 55–72, 82–91. 
 128. Paul Mosley, Microfinance and Poverty in Bolivia, 7–8 37 J. DEV. STUD., 
no. 4, Apr. 2001 at 101, 127. 
 129. Herbert Muller, Las microfinanzas reguladas en Bolivia [Regulated 
Microfinances in Bolivia], 10 Tinkazos 71, 71–82 (2007), http://www.scielo. 
org.bo/scielo.php?script=sci_pdf&pid=S1990-74512007000100005&lng=en&nrm 
=iss&tlng=es (last visited Apr. 8, 2012) (on file with the Washington and Lee 
Law Review). 
 130. See RHYNE, supra note 120, at 141–44 (describing these consumer 
lenders and comparing their methods to those of microlenders within Bolivia). 
 131. Id. at 144–45. 
 132. González & González-Vega, supra note 56, at 63 tbl.XIII.2.  
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economic activity.133 Loan defaults mounted rapidly and borrower 
distress led to the organizing of a social movement. Between 1998 
and 2002, several thousand borrowers formed various debtors’ 
associations and demanded forgiveness of debts.134 Many of the 
protestors had borrowed from a single microlending institution 
(Bolivia has many) called Acceso, which was shut down shortly 
thereafter.135 Failure of this institution was attributed to its 
grossly inadequate underwriting.136  
In response to the social movements demanding debt relief, 
the Bolivian government implemented measures in 1999 and 
2001 to postpone payments on microloans.137 A number of the 
consumer lenders eventually collapsed.138 However, not all 
microlenders in Bolivia did poorly during the crisis. Several key 
characteristics distinguished the microlenders that failed during 
the Bolivian crisis from those that continued to grow and to 
maintain low levels of payment defaults. Among these were: 
• low loan amounts and limits; 
• a “village banking” model, in which some interest is 
set aside for emergency loans to borrowing group 
members as a form of default insurance; 
• an integrated program of services that help ensure 
borrower loyalty, including training, advice, health 
services, and political education; 
• maintaining a careful screening process to ensure 
borrower repayment ability.139 
The strongest players in the Bolivian microsector, including 
BancoSol, continue to operate profitably and provide credit to the 
poor.140 
                                                                                                     
 133. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 250–51. 
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The Bolivian regulators, Superintendency of Banks and 
Financial Institutions (SBEF) and the Financial System 
Supervision Authority (ASFI), responded to the overindebtedness 
crisis with a range of regulatory measures. First, a system of 
credit reporting was established to permit microfinance lenders to 
obtain information about borrowers’ other outstanding loans, 
with a view to responsible lending.141 Second, debt service was 
limited to 30% of salary for employees.142 Third, ASFI now 
mandates disclosure of loan terms, including interest rate, 
whether it is fixed or variable, itemization of fees, and so forth, 
similar to the U.S. Truth in Lending Act scheme.143 Finally, ASFI 
requires every financial institution to provide a Service for 
Response to Client Claims (Servicio de Atencion de Reclamos de 
Clientes) to receive and monitor borrower and customer 
complaints.144  
The Bolivian lenders that concentrated on larger, more 
profitable consumer loans to employees fared the worst, while 
socially oriented lenders that focused on microloans for capital 
investment appear to have survived the Bolivian crisis in better 
condition.145 Proponents of microfinance lending argue that its 
success depends on lenders differentiating loans for investment 
from loans for consumption.146 The Bolivian regulator defines 
microcredit as “a loan to a borrower—either an individual, a 
business, or a group of individuals—for the purpose of financing 
small-scale production, trade, or provision of services and where 
the assessment of repayment capacity of the borrower is based on 
the revenues generated by these activities.”147 On the other hand, 
                                                                                                     
 141. Autoridad de Supervision del Sistema Financiero (ASFI), La Regulación 
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 145. Marconi & Mosley, supra note 122, at 257–58. 
 146. LOUBIÈRE ET AL., supra note 141, at 15. 
 147. Id. at 36. 
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critics argue that a majority of microloan borrowers do not use 
the funds for their stated purposes.148  
It is not clear at this point whether the regulatory measures 
(credit reporting, explicit debt-to-income ratio caps, and 
disclosure) have prevented or will prevent overindebtedness and 
future debt crises. Bolivia still faces an overabundance of 
consumer credit with high default rates on the one hand and a 
shortage of small-loan financing for microenterprises on the 
other.149  
B. South Africa 
Shortly before the end of the Apartheid regime in 1994, the 
South African government sought ways to attack the most 
pressing problems of the black majority, including housing and 
poverty. Microcredit was embraced as one tool to combat 
entrenched poverty.150 A prior first step had been the Usury Act 
Exemption of 1992, which removed legal limits on interest rates 
for small loans, defined as less than 6,000 rand (about $1,000) 
and for terms of no more than thirty-six months.151 The removal 
of rate ceilings was not accompanied at first by any government 
effort to fund NGOs to provide credit to the poor at reasonable 
cost, nor was any consumer protection regulation initially put in 
place.  
What developed in the mid-1990s was a rapid growth of 
thirty-day loan products, similar to the U.S. payday loan market, 
and extremely high rates.152 Large banks quickly came to 
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CREDIT: A REVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF THE NATIONAL CREDIT ACT ONE YEAR AFTER 
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dominate the rapidly growing sector.153 Most small loans were not 
made to entrepreneurs but to wage earners, based on the lender’s 
ability to have access to the borrower’s bank account and 
salary.154 Thus, the lifting of usury ceilings, a necessary condition 
to microlending in the Grameen Bank model, did not by itself 
result in Grameen-style microenterprise lending. Instead, a large 
and profitable consumer lending sector arose, leading to 
widespread complaints about a lack of consumer understanding, 
excessive charges, and irresponsible lending leading to 
overindebtedness.155 Harsh collection measures were used. For 
example, many borrowers gave lenders bank cards and PIN 
numbers and were faced with seizure of their entire incomes to 
service accumulated debt, making them unable to provide for 
their basic needs.156  
The resulting debt crisis led to the enactment of the 2005 
National Credit Act.157 The purpose of the new law was to: 
[P]romote and advance the social and economic welfare of 
South Africans . . . by: 
(a) promoting the development of a credit market that 
is accessible to all South Africans, and in particular to 
those who have historically been unable to access credit 
under sustainable market conditions; 
(b) ensuring consistent treatment of different credit 
products and different credit providers: 
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(c) promoting responsibility in the credit market by— 
(i) encouraging responsible borrowing, avoidance 
of over-indebtedness and fulfilment of financial 
obligations by consumers; and 
(ii) discouraging reckless credit granting by 
credit providers and contractual default by 
consumers . . . .158 
South Africa’s National Credit Act prohibits lenders from 
entering into any “reckless credit agreement” with consumers.159 
A reckless credit agreement means either that the consumer does 
not understand the risks, costs, and obligations under the 
agreement or that the credit results in the consumer being 
overindebted.160 Overindebted consumers may seek relief from 
reckless credit by first consulting a debt advice agency and then 
applying for court-ordered cancellation or restructuring of the 
reckless credit.161 The enactment of the National Credit Act does 
not seem to have had a dramatic impact on loan approval rates, 
which have declined somewhat, or on overall indebtedness, but it 
is perhaps too soon to tell.162  
Despite the enactment of the National Credit Act, South 
African consumers continue to suffer from high levels of debt 
stress. The National Credit Regulator reported in March 2010 
that only 54% of active credit consumers were current in their 
payments.163 Efforts to deal with overindebtedness through credit 
counseling and repayment plans have had little success to date.164 
The current picture of small-loan credit in South Africa remains 
one of excess supply of consumer loans to salary earners with 
widespread overindebtedness on one hand and a continuing 
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dearth of credit for microenterprises on the other.165 While 
interest rates have declined and collection abuses have been 
reduced, it appears, on balance, that small-loan credit has not 
increased the welfare of South Africa’s poor during the post-
Apartheid period.166 
V. The United States Experience—Payday Lending and 
Incoherent Usury Laws 
The problematic welfare effects of small loans and credit 
cards in the United States on the poor have been written about at 
length.167 One of the most controversial developments of the 
1990s was the phenomenal growth of payday loan companies, 
which largely displaced pawnbrokers and finance companies as 
lenders to low- and moderate-income workers.168 Payday lenders 
provide loans in small amounts ($500 or less) for short periods, 
typically two weeks, at annual interest rates sometimes 
exceeding 500%.169  
The policy debate surrounding payday lending in the United 
States has revolved around two issues: the high price of payday 
loans and the debt trap problem, where borrowers continually 
renew loans because of an apparent inability to repay them.170 
The price and debt trap issues are, of course, linked, because the 
high annual rates have less impact when borrowers repay loans 
in two weeks or a month, but the costs are more likely to 
outweigh the welfare benefits when borrowers pay only the 
interest and postpone payment on the principal for longer 
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periods. Theoretically, even borrowers repeatedly using payday 
loans might obtain net welfare gains. The empirical evidence, 
however, suggests otherwise: payday borrowers systematically 
underestimate both the costs of borrowing and their likelihood of 
falling into the debt trap.171 
Defenders of payday lending, on the other hand, challenge 
the industry critics’ claims that the product harms borrowers. 
Jim Hawkins, for example, contends that debt distress is not a 
likely result of payday loans and other small-loan products 
because the amount borrowed is limited and because lenders 
verify applicants’ credit scores and outstanding debt (although 
his description of product terms and lender practices is more 
anecdotal than empirical).172 One study found that greater access 
to payday lenders for borrowers affected by natural disasters led 
to a reduction in bad welfare outcomes, as measured by 
foreclosures and property-theft crimes.173 In other words, 
emergency borrowing can help avoid shocks that increase 
expenses or reduce income. Another study compared borrowers in 
two neighboring states, one with legal restrictions on payday 
lending, and found that access to payday loans may increase 
employment or job retention and perceived economic well-
being.174 None of these studies attempts to compare the cost of 
payday loans with these welfare benefits. Studies finding either 
benefits or harms of payday lending have tended to isolate one or 
two borrower impacts for study175 rather than attempting a true, 
                                                                                                     
 171. Marianne Bertrand & Adair Morse, Information Disclosure, Cognitive 
Biases and Payday Borrowing 16–18 (Univ. of Chicago Booth Sch. of Bus., 
Working Paper No. 10-01, Oct. 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=1532213; Parrish & King, supra note 6, at 15–16; Stegman & Faris, 
supra note 6, at 13. 
 172. Jim Hawkins, Regulating on the Fringe: Reexamining the Link Between 
Fringe Banking and Financial Distress, 86 IND. L. J. 1361, 1376–1401 (2011).  
 173. Adair Morse, Payday Lenders: Heroes or Villains? 3 (Univ. of Chicago 
Booth Sch. of Bus., Working Paper, 2009), available at http://papers.ssrn. 
com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1344397. 
 174. Zinman, supra note 13, at 13–15. 
 175. Bart J. Wilson et al., An Experimental Analysis of the Demand for 
Payday Loans, B.E.J. ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y (2010) John Y. Campbell et al., 
The Regulation of Consumer Financial Products: An Introductory Essay with 
Four Case Studies 27–33 (Harvard Univ. John F. Kennedy Sch. of Gov’t, Faculty 
Research Working Paper No. RWP 10-40, 2010), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1649647. 
1130 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1093 (2012) 
complete cost–benefit analysis that would determine aggregate 
welfare impact. 
At present the United States’ legal framework regulating 
small-loan lending is entirely incoherent. Usury limits vary from 
state to state.176 Some state laws are displaced by federal law or 
other states’ laws through “rate exportation”; small-loan 
regulation varies depending on the amount, purpose, duration, 
and collateral of the loan, and the license or charter of the lender; 
and no state or federal agency has articulated a set of principles 
for differentiating beneficial from harmful credit products.177 
Interest rates are capped and uncapped in a schizophrenic 
manner as regulators struggle with the competing claims of 
lending industry and consumer advocates. 
Usury laws in the United States consist of at least four 
layers. The first, general usury ceiling, dating from the Statute of 
Anne, typically limits interest rates broadly to low levels such as 
5% or 6%.178 The second layer consists of the small-loan laws 
adopted between 1916 and 1930.179 Small-loan acts were 
prompted by calls for reform from the Russell Sage Foundation 
and others seeking to legalize and regulate the underground 
loansharking and salary-lending industry.180 These acts typically 
require lenders to be licensed, limit loan amounts and terms, and 
set rate caps at 24% to 36% per annum.181 
The third set of laws was adopted in the states beginning in 
the 1980s to permit higher cost lending to low- and moderate-
income consumers. Laws authorizing rent-to-own transactions, 
payday loans, and other fringe lending either removed all rate 
ceilings or adopted very high levels of finance charges as the new 
norm.182 These laws, like the small-loan laws a half a century 
earlier, recognized the existence of strong consumer demand for 
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high-cost credit products and either removed all regulatory 
impediments or sought to restrict only the perceived abuses at 
the margin of “fringe” lending.183 
Finally, the fourth layer consists of federal preemption, in 
both the removal and partial reimposition of usury limits. Small-
loan interest rates and terms are deregulated by federal 
preemption in two ways. First, federally chartered banks and 
thrifts are free from most state usury and credit laws.184 Second, 
the federally chartered institutions may take advantage of the 
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Marquette National 
Savings Bank of Minneapolis v. First of Omaha Service Corp.,185 
which permits a national bank to comply with the law of its home 
state while doing business in other states, in essence “exporting” 
the usury laws of one state to others. However, for reputational 
and safety and soundness reasons, federal regulators eventually 
persuaded banks to exit the payday lending business by 2005.186 
Congress also reimposed usury limits for some consumers in the 
Talent-Nelson Military Lending Act of 2006, limiting interest 
charged to members of the armed forces and their families to 
36%.187 Although the statute was worded very broadly, Defense 
Department regulations limited the reach of Talent–Nelson to a 
discrete set of loan products, specifically payday loans, car title 
loans, and tax refund anticipation loans.188  
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We can summarize U.S. regulation of payday lending as 
follows. States first decided to allow small-loan lending at rates 
around 36% in the 1930s, decided higher rates were needed to 
facilitate payday lending in the 1990s, and were then preempted 
as to both federally chartered lenders that could charge unlimited 
rates and to military families by the federal government’s 
conclusion that credit at rates above 36% APR to soldiers did 
more harm than good. Most recently, Congress reaffirmed our 
national ambivalence about regulating consumer credit by 
establishing a new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(CFPB) with the power to prohibit abusive practices while, at the 
same time, expressly forbidding the CFPB to enact usury limits, 
whatever that might mean.189  
Those states and regulators that chose not to limit interest 
rates or that set very high ceilings have sought to mitigate 
harmful effects of payday loans in other ways. Some states 
impose repayment term limits but encounter practical difficulties 
in enforcing such limits.190 In a market with many competitors, 
consumers can evade a single lender’s prudential rules limiting 
debt amount or period outstanding by borrowing from multiple 
lenders. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) tried 
to mitigate the debt trap in its 2005 guidance for federally 
insured banks partnering with payday lenders.191 The guidance 
stated that “[w]hen a customer has used payday loans more than 
three months in the past twelve months, institutions should offer 
the customer, or refer the customer to, an alternative longer-term 
credit product that more appropriately suits the customer’s 
needs.”192 Consumer advocates criticized both the FDIC guidance 
and the more aggressive state restrictions on excessive renewals 
                                                                                                     
Members and Dependents, 71 Fed. Reg. 70,512, 70,512 (proposed Dec. 5, 2006), 
available at http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation 
/regulators/MLA-DOD-FINAL-2-5-07-A.pdf. 
 189. Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2010 § 1027(o), Title X of 
Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203 
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5517). 
 190. Florida, for example, established a credit reporting database for payday 
borrowers and restricted “rollovers,” i.e., new loans to repay old loans, while 
imposing a sixty-day “grace period” for repayment for troubled borrowers. 
Spector, supra note 183, at 116. 
 191. See FDIC, supra note 186. 
 192. Id. 
CREDIT AND HUMAN WELFARE 1133 
and overborrowing as insufficient to prevent the serious borrower 
harm caused by payday loans.193 Small-loan regulation will 
persist in its incoherence until (1) there is some agreement on the 
norms to be applied, (2) we agree what costs and benefits to 
measure, if cost–benefit analysis is the norm, and (3) adequate 
empirical study of the costs and benefits has been completed. 
VI. The Role of Law and Regulation in Fostering Beneficial Credit 
for the Poor 
The microcredit experience of the past twenty years in 
developing nations demonstrates that “mechanisms matter,”194 
i.e., the success and the benefits to the borrowers of small loans 
depends on credit product design as well as the uses to which the 
credit is put. The experiences in Bangladesh, South Africa, and 
Boliva, among others, also show that deregulation is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for welfare-improving credit for the 
poor. In fact, the result of unregulated markets, as shown by the 
examples of South Africa and Bolivia, is quite the opposite. Credit 
products that do not amortize, that are not appropriately limited 
in amount, and that provide no insurance against income shocks 
may tend to drive out more welfare-enhancing products.  
The empirical evidence shows that unrestricted lending and 
borrowing leads rather predictably to debt overhang and traps 
the poor in a cycle of borrowing to service past debt. Moreover, 
payment of interest, especially above-market interest, has 
negative distributional consequences, transferring income away 
from the poor. Beneficial microcredit and small-loan credit have 
observable and distinguishing characteristics, and the challenge 
for the law is to devise credit regulation schemes that will foster 
credit with these characteristics while minimizing the boom-bust 
cycle of overindebtedness and the tendency of bad credit to drive 
out good credit.  
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To foster welfare-enhancing credit, regulation needs to 
address the risks faced by low-income workers and 
entrepreneurs: the risk of overborrowing and the risk of 
catastrophic events that lead to default. Overborrowing risk may 
be mitigated through credit-product design (e.g., requiring 
amortization) and requirements for lenders to assess repayment 
ability properly. Default risk and the costs it imposes on 
borrowers could be mitigated by the development of suitable 
credit insurance products. 
The Grameen Bank’s success has not been dependent on a 
rule of law model; while the bank has a legal charter, the terms of 
its loans to borrowers and the means for enforcing repayment are 
largely extra-legal. Its success has been due in part to somewhat 
unique circumstances in Bangladesh that have prevented market 
entry by less socially directed banks and lenders. Nevertheless, 
credit regulation should be informed by several key aspects of the 
Grameen Bank model that contrast with the forms of lending to 
the poor that led to failure in South Africa and Bolivia, among 
others. 
First, the Grameen model implicitly incorporates several key 
principles of responsible lending to protect against the risk of 
overborrowing. Loan amounts start small, with repayment 
required over a relatively short time period and, more 
importantly, always with amortization of principal. Loan 
amounts increase only as long as payment is made. In a study of 
low-income credit card borrowers in the United States, 
participants identified mandatory amortization over a fixed time 
period and the ability to choose a credit limit as desirable 
features of credit products from the standpoint of their own desire 
for self-control measures.195 
Second, insurance against the various disasters that 
predictably befall the poor is critical to the Grameen model. This 
feature can be mimicked through regulation encouraging or 
mandating linked savings programs or fairly priced life and 
disability insurance.196 Unfortunately, credit insurance products 
in the United States have been plagued by excessive cost and 
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very low loss ratios because of various market failures.197 Another 
form of insurance is the Grameen Bank’s policy of always 
renegotiating and modifying repayment terms, while still 
mandating continual repayment of principal and interest, when 
borrowers get into difficulty. Regulation could require reasonable 
workout terms for low-income borrowers, as the Federal Housing 
Administration (FHA) mortgage loan program now does for at-
risk home loan borrowers in the United States.198 The 2005 FDIC 
guidance for payday lending included a requirement that lenders 
assist borrowers who were unable to begin principal repayment 
within a given time period by offering an installment payment 
plan at a reduced interest rate.199  
Indeed, many of the emergency needs that prompt the poor to 
borrow in the first place would be better met with reasonably 
priced savings or insurance products. The microfinance 
movement explicitly recognizes this by promoting not only 
microloans for the poor but also the more comprehensive 
provision of financial services. 
Thus, the small-loan programs most likely to improve the 
welfare of the poor have the following characteristics: 
• Responsible lending based on credit reporting: Loan 
amounts are limited based on repayment ability, and 
repayment ability is carefully assessed at initial loan 
and renewal stages. Borrowers in repayment difficulty 
have reduced access to additional credit. Credit 
reporting is comprehensive so that any lender should 
know the amount and terms of outstanding debt a 
potential borrower is already carrying. While 
borrowers have legitimate privacy concerns about 
credit reporting, there is no effective way to prevent 
overindebtedness without comprehensive credit 
reports. 
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• Insurance and default mitigation: Borrowers are 
forced to insure against default-triggering events 
through, for example, emergency loan pools. The 
Grameen Bank lending model requires borrowers to 
set aside a small portion of loan proceeds for an 
emergency fund to provide for repayment or 
additional loans when group members face default 
due to unexpected events.200 Many other insurance 
mechanisms are possible, but the need for insuring 
poor borrowers against unexpected events triggering 
default is evident.201 
• Mandatory but flexible principal repayment: Loans 
are always amortizing; that is, however small the 
payment, it is designed to repay interest and principal 
within a reasonable time period, and balloon or 
negative amortizing payments are not allowed. Most 
microfinance institutions have preferred to require 
frequent periodic (typically weekly) payments. One 
study has shown that such frequent payment 
schedules are not necessary to ensure low default 
rates among poor borrowers, and indeed costs can be 
effectively reduced with a monthly payment schedule 
without increasing the risk of nonpayment.202 On the 
other hand, regular and frequent contact between 
loan officers and borrowers is a common feature of 
microlending that increases repayment rates and 
limits overborrowing. Nevertheless, considering 
successful microcredit programs with the debt trap 
experienced by U.S. payday borrowers, one can see 
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the utility of limiting repayment periods and 
requiring principal amortization. 
• Product differentiation based on use: While no 
microcredit or consumer loan program can prevent 
borrowers from squandering their loan proceeds or 
compel them to make income-producing investments, 
the fact remains that the use to which loan proceeds 
are put will often determine whether the borrower 
will be better or worse off as a result of the loan. In 
the Grameen Bank model and similarly inspired 
microcredit programs, some borrower training or 
counseling is provided, and the use of the borrowed 
funds is somewhat constrained or guided, with 
preference for either entrepreneurial investing to 
produce income or acquisition of capital goods such as 
housing or durable goods. Loans for emergencies are 
offered, but loans for chronic consumption shortfalls 
are discouraged or denied. Direct regulation of how 
loan funds are used is neither likely nor desirable. On 
the other hand, credit regulation can and should make 
distinctions among credit products recognizing the 
differing consumer welfare impact of, for example, 
loans for housing or business creation compared with 
loans for short-term consumption needs. Borrowers 
use some U.S. payday loans for emergencies, but most 
are used to pay living expenses or other debts.203 
United States consumer protection and usury laws 
already differentiate to some degree between 
business-purpose and consumer loans, usually by 
excluding the former from consumer protection law 
coverage.204  
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• Reasonable and transparent pricing: Grameen Bank 
established its interest rate (20% per annum) based 
on social, rather than profit, criteria.205 For small-loan 
credit to benefit the poor, interest rates and fees must 
remain below the likely welfare gains borrowers 
obtain by borrowing. In a regulated and competitive 
market, the regulator’s role will be not to dictate or 
limit pricing but to limit complexity, maximize clarity 
in advertising and contract forms, and monitor 
market pricing to respond to rent-seeking and 
exploitation. In markets where pricing exceeds likely 
welfare benefits, regulation should stigmatize the 
products as risky and promote better alternatives. 
VII. Conclusion 
Once we observe that more small-loan credit is not necessarily 
better, i.e., that indefinite expansion of loan volumes does not 
obviously improve the individual or aggregate welfare of borrowers 
(or lenders, for that matter), the task of the regulator becomes 
clear. First, we need a set of tools with which to evaluate the 
benefits and harms of small-loan lending, including the choices 
and opportunities such loans potentially offer, as well as the 
deprivation and misery that repayment and default can impose. To 
that end, I propose borrowing from the human development 
approach. Existing research offers some promising, albeit partial, 
measurements of credit benefits, such as investment in income-
producing activity, consumption smoothing, and protection from 
emergency shocks to income and consumption. As for the costs and 
harm side of the equation, a credit regulator can begin to provide 
important measures by conducting periodic empirical and 
comprehensive surveys of interest rates, as well as all other 
charges and fees and other terms of small-loan credit, as the South 
African regulator has done.206 To complete the picture on the costs 
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side, considerably more research is needed to measure and weigh 
the variety of harms caused by debt default and distress and the 
rate at which default or other bad outcomes occur for given credit 
products and markets.207 
Second, we need to consider the range of potential 
interventions, including both ex ante regulation but also ex post 
debt relief measures like bankruptcy, which are beyond the scope 
of this Article. Regulatory strategies certainly must consider 
displacement and substitution effects, i.e., the risk that reducing 
the supply of harmful credit may cause borrowers to turn to even 
worse products. This quick survey of the experiences of different 
nations with small-loan credit is not intended to propose definitive 
conclusions. Nevertheless, some ex ante credit regulation strategies 
appear promising, including the broadest possible use of credit 
reporting with responsible lending rules that limit excess 
borrowing and reduce the risk of defaults, the provision of 
insurance or repayment relief in the event of catastrophe, and the 
requirement to always amortize principal in order to prevent debt 
spiraling. Obviously, a fact-based regulatory plan will include 
continuing measurement of the benefits and harms of small loans 
as they are actually taken up in real markets by real borrowers. 
The approach of the 1930s small-loan laws in the United 
States was to link a liberalized usury regime for small loans to 
consumer protections, including caps on loan amounts, and 
restrictions on problematic terms such as balloon payments in 
order to ensure that the resulting credit was beneficial. This 
schema may simply need to be updated in recognition of what has 
been learned through improved empirical research in deregulated 
markets in the United States and around the world. The next 
generation of credit laws and regulations needs to recognize and 
encourage the loan product design features that deliver genuine 
welfare improvements for lower-income borrowers while 
discouraging rent-seeking exploitation, debt spiraling, and further 
impoverishment. 
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